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THE  QUEST FOR  A NEW  CORPORATE  TAXATION  MODEL AND FOR 
AN EFFECTIVE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE 
WITHIN THE EU  
Dr. Luca Cerioni (*) 
1. Introduction 
    In the backdrop of an increasing awareness about the inadequacy of  the corporate 
taxation systems to the current economic reality of business activity and in particular 
of multinationals,  and of the increasing concern to fight international tax avoidance, 
the Commission published the March 2015 Tax Transparency Package1, the June 2015 
Communication on “A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European 
Union”2, and the January 2016 “Anti-Tax Avoidance Package” (A.T.A.P.)3.    
     In particular, the Commission has been consistently stressing that companies should 
pay tax in the country where profits are generated, which would be the country where 
the activity takes place4, and has made it clear that its long-term objective lies in the 
adoption of a mandatory Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)5. In its 
view, this would be essential for achieving a fair, efficient and transparent corporate 
taxation system, and, once adopted, CCCTB would prevent aggressive tax planning in 
the EU6. However, pending the adoption of the CCCTB, the Commission has been 
proposing a number of measures for ensuring taxation where profits are generated, and, 
in this connection, for enhancing Member States’ abilities to tackle international tax 
avoidance. 
    Given that specific proposals submitted in the literature have been trying to offer 
inputs on how to achieve, in essence, the same objectives,  three issues seem to arise: 
whether the Commission’s proposals  appear to be more or less consistent with such 
objectives than the solutions suggested by literature; whether an additional far-reaching 
proposal could be elaborated to collect the inputs offered by literature and to facilitate 
the Commission’s long-term objective, how this proposal could be structured. 
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1 COM(2015)136final, Communication on tax transparency to fight tax evasion and avoidance, at p. 5 
2  COM(2015)302 final, A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for 
Action, 
3 COM(2016)23/2, Anti-Tax Avoidance Package: Next Steps towards delivering effective taxation and greater tax 
transparency in the EU 
4  COM(2015),302final, cit., at 2; COM(2016)23/2, at p. 2 and 4   
5  COM(2015),302final, cit., at 7; COM(2016)23/2, at p. 8   
6 Id. 
    This work intends addressing these issues,  without any claim to exhaust them.  
 2. The Commission’s intended actions and the proposals in the A.T.A.P. 
    In the June 2015 Communication, the Commission  specified that the new corporate 
taxation approach needed in the EU, to achieve  a fairer and more efficient taxation and 
to fight tax avoidance, would serve to: re-establish the link between taxation and where 
economic activity takes place; ensure that Member States can correctly value corporate 
activity in their jurisdiction; create a competitive and growth-friendly corporate tax 
environment for the EU; protect the single market and secure EU approach to external 
corporate tax issues, including measures to implement the OECD Action Plan on base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) which has the purpose of tackling aggressive tax 
planning at a global level7.   
    To achieve all intended objectives, the Commission proposed change in the 
following five areas8: a) re-launching the common consolidated corporate tax base 
(CCCBT) project, for which a draft Directive was published in 20119; b) ensuring 
effective taxation where profits are generated; c) achieving a better tax environment 
for businesses; d) ensuring tax transparency; e) strengthening EU tools for cooperation.  
   To re-launch the CCCTB project, a new proposal would make it mandatory – rather 
than optional – and would develop a staged approach to its implementation.  This 
staged approach would firstly focus on securing a common tax base, and, only after the 
implementation of a common tax base, it would concentrate on consolidation.  The 
common tax base, on its own, is expected to bring major benefits in comparison with 
the current situation: the elimination of mismatches between national systems, which 
are often exploited by aggressive tax planners; the elimination of the possibility of 
using preferential regimes for profit shifting; etc.. 
    The Commission stated that a fully fledged CCCTB would make a major difference 
in strengthening the link between taxation and the place where profits are generated. 
However, it also argued that – pending the preparation of the new proposal – the work 
should continue on international aspects of the common tax base which are linked to 
the OECD’s  BEPS project, and which should be essential in ensuring effective taxation 
where profits are generated.   
    Consistently with these intentions, the January 2016  A.T.A.P. aimed at ensuring a 
coordinated implementation in Member States of BEPS measures, and in several 
                                                          
7 OECD (2013) Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publications, p. 7-8  
8 R.Veldhuizen, T. Adorjan, EU Introduces Plans Regarding a Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System, European 
Taxation, vol. 55, No. 11, 2015, 523 - 527 
9 Proposal for a Council Directive for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM (2011), 121/4.   
respects, marked a follow-up of the initiatives set out in the 2015 Action Plan.  The 
A.T.A.P. included: a proposal for a general Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, aimed at 
introducing uniform measures to target typical aggressive tax planning strategies which 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market10; a Recommendation on the 
implementation of measures relating to permanent establishments (PE) and of the 
report on tax treaty abuse issued by the G20/OECD11; a proposal for a Directive 
amending the Administrative Cooperation Directive to implement the “country-by-
country reporting”(CbCR)12, a Communication on an effective strategy toward third 
countries13, and a staff working document providing further analysis and support for 
these initiatives14.   
     The proposal for a general Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, which was conceived to 
achieve a balance between a certain degree of uniformity in implementing the rules 
recommended in the BEPS plan across Member States and the need to accommodate 
the specific features of their tax systems within these new rules,  is expected to create 
a level playing field of minimum protection for all Member States’ corporate tax 
systems15.  For this purpose, this proposal  would require Member States: to limit the 
deduction of interest-expenses in relation to intra-group borrowing16; to levy exit taxes 
with the option of deferred payment through at least five annual instalments17; to apply 
a shift from the exemption method to the tax credit method (“switch-over clause”) in 
case of income received by a resident taxpayer from an entity resident in a low-tax 
third country18; to set a general anti-abuse rule (G.A.A.R.), under which national tax 
authorities would ignore non-genuine arrangements (i.e., arrangements which are not 
implemented for valid commercial reasons) for the purpose of calculating the corporate 
tax liability19; to apply CFC rules to controlled subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions20; 
to eliminate the cases of double non-taxation caused by hybrid mismatches (i.e., by 
differences between two legal systems in the characterisation of financial instruments 
or of entities)21.  The proposed Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive constitutes therefore the 
most substantial component of the effort to ensure effective taxation where profits are 
                                                          
10 COM(2016)26 final, 28.1.2016, laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning 
of the internal market 
11 Commission Recommendation C (2016)271final, 28.1.2016, on the implementation of measures against tax treaty 
abuse. 
12 COM(2016), 25 final, 28.1.2016 amending Directive 2011/16 as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information 
in the field of taxation 
13 COM(2016)24final, 28.1.2016,  on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation. 
14  COM(2016)23 
15 COM(2016)26 final, cit., at 4 
16 Id, Art. 4 
17 Id., Art. 5 
18 Id., Art. 6 
19 Id., Art. 7 
20 Id., Art. 8 and 9 
21 Id., Art. 10 
generated, since its provisions would target the typical strategies through which 
companies (e.g., through tax residence transfers) and corporate groups (e.g., through 
inflated interests payments or through payments exceeding arms’ length prices to 
subsidiaries in low-tax countries) could be able to shift profits to lower-tax 
jurisdictions.   
    The same ratio (of ensuring effective taxation where profits are generated) is shared 
by the Recommendation included in the A.T.A.P., which encourages Member States 
to implement the proposed new provisions of Art. 5 of the OECD Model as drawn up 
in the final report on Action 7 of the BEPS22. This implies that Member States should 
expand the definition of PE, to include “commissionaire arrangements” and to restrict 
the specific exceptions applicable to activities of preparatory or auxiliary nature.  
      With regard to ensuring a better tax environment for business, in the 2015 Action 
Plan the Commission highlighted its intention – pending the introduction of a full 
CCCTB consolidation - to propose the offsetting of profits and losses of corporate 
groups in different Member States, and stressed the need to improve double taxation 
dispute resolution mechanisms23. In the A.T.A.P., these intentions were not expressly 
stated again, but the Commission, in the accompanying Communication, specified that 
the measures included in the A.T.A.P. have been designed so as “to minimize the risk 
of double taxation as much as possible”24. Moreover, in draft Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive, it clarified that, should the proposed rules give rise to double taxation, 
taxpayers should receive relief through a deduction for foreign tax paid, so that those 
rules – in addition to countering tax avoidance practice – should also avoid creating 
obstacles to the market such as double taxation25.  Although the Commission has 
interchangeably used the wording “minimize” and “avoid” with respect to double 
taxation, it has therefore made it evident (again) that the elimination of double 
taxation26 is as necessary as the fight against aggressive tax planning.       
    In the area of tax transparency, the 2015 Tax Transparency Package27 already 
resulted in the introduction of Directive 2015/2376 which has amended the 
Administrative Cooperation Directive28 through the extension of the automatic 
information exchange to advance “cross-border tax rulings” and “advance pricing 
                                                          
22 Commission Recommendation  C(2016)271final, cit., Art. 3 
23 COM(2015(302)final, cit., at p. 11-12. 
24 COM(2016)23/2, cit., at p. 8 
25 COM(2016) 26 final, cit, at p. 11 
26 Which was already indicated as an objective in the Communication COM(2011)712final, double taxation in the internal 
market.  
27 COM(2015)136final, Communication on tax transparency to fight tax evasion and avoidance, at p. 5 
28 Council Directive 2011/16/EU as regards administrative cooperation in the field of taxation, of 15 February 2011, OJ 
EU L 64/1 of 11.03.2011 
agreements” (APAs) in the area of transfer pricing29. These amendments were 
proposed on the assumption that it is other Member States which are best placed to 
assess the potential impact and relevance of such rulings, rather than the Member State 
giving the ruling30. They are supposed to ensure greater openness and transparency 
between the tax authorities, and to help governments to better protect their tax bases.  
Directive 2015/2376 contains broad definitions of “advance cross-border rulings” and 
of APAs31. The former include rulings which concern the interpretation or application 
of a legal or administrative provisions relating to cross-border transactions, or to the 
question whether activities carried on in another jurisdiction create a PE. The latter 
include unilateral or bilateral or multilateral APAs and/or decisions, which indicate, in 
advance of a proposed transactions, an appropriate set of criteria for the determination 
of transfer pricing or determines the attribution of profits to a PE32.  
     Once the new definition of PE based on the final report for Action 7 of the BEPS 
were adopted, following the Commission’s Recommendation included in the A.T.A.P, 
the exchange of “advance cross-border rulings” concerning the existence of a PE would 
serve as a reciprocal cross-checking, as between Member States, of the conformity of 
their national rulings with this adjusted definition of PE.     
     In the A.T.A.P., the Commission carried forward two other tax transparency 
initiatives, that it had anticipated in the 2015 Action Plan: ensuring a more common 
approach towards third country non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, due to the worldwide 
scale of corporate tax avoidance, and introducing a CbCR in the EU.   
    On the one hand, the A.T.A.P. Communication on an external strategy for effective 
taxation33 highlights the goal to achieve a common EU approach in assessing, screening 
and listing third countries, to identify those jurisdictions which do not comply with 
good tax governance and to make it possible a unified EU response to these 
jurisdictions (exchange of information is regarded as a key component of good tax 
governance).   On the other hand, the introduction of a CbCR is being pursued, in the 
proposal for amending the Administrative Cooperation Directive34, by requiring a 
mandatory automatic exchange of information on CbCR. Under this proposal, each 
Member State would require the resident ultimate parent company of a multinational 
                                                          
29 Council Directive 2015/2376 of 8 December 2015, amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic 
exchange of information in the field of taxation, in OJ EU L 332 of 18.12.2015.  
 
30  Communication   COM(2015)135final, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards 
mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation 
 
31  Council Directive 2015/2376, cit., Art. 1(b).  
32  Id.  
33 COM(2016)24final, cit.  
34 COM(2016)25final, cit. 
group to file a CbCR, and, by means of automatic exchange, would communicate this 
report to any other Member State where, on the bases of the information on the report 
itself, the group has either subsidiaries or PEs35. As the CbCR would contain 
information – in terms of revenues, profits before taxes, income tax paid and accrued, 
number of employees, stated capital, accumulated earnings, tangible assets or cash 
equivalent – concerning each jurisdiction in which a multinational groups operates36,  
the information relating to extra-EU jurisdictions to be included in the CbCR could 
only be verified with the cooperation of the concerned extra-EU tax authorities. The 
external strategy for effective taxation and the introduction of a CbCR therefore turn 
out being complementary to each other.  
      A fifth area of action, in the 2015 Action Plan,  would strengthen EU tools for 
coordination. The Commission anticipated a new proposal to extend the mandate of 
the Code of Good Conduct on Business Taxation37,  to allow it to react more efficiently 
to cases of “harmful tax competition”. It also announced its intention to promote greater 
cooperation between Member States as regards tax inspections and tax audits – which 
is provided for in the Administrative Cooperation Directive38 – and, in this respect, to 
start a discussion within the Platform on Tax Good Governance39. In the A.T.A.P., 
these two final intentions were not expressly repeated, though they are certainly 
compatible with the contents of the A.T.A.P. itself.  
        All short-term initiatives set out in the Action Plan - amongst which those carried 
forward in the A.T.A.P. - should be regarded as short-term measures supporting or 
facilitating the long-term introduction of the CCCTB40. The Commission has,  
however, stated that the short-term measures, in essence, would have a merit on their 
own, as they “will contribute to achieving revenue stability, a stronger Single Market, 
greater corporate resilience and efficiency and a fair and level-playing field for 
businesses”41.     
                                                          
35 Id. Art. 1(2).  
36 Id., Art. 1(3) 
37 EU Code of Conduct (1997), Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning taxation 
policy, DOC  98/ C2/ 01, OJ C2 (1998)  
38 Council Directive 2011/16, cit., Art. 12 
39 I.e, the Commission Expert Group known as Platform for Good Tax Governance, Aggressive Tax Planning and Double 
Taxation, set up by Commission Decision of 23.4.2013, C(2013)2236Final.  
40  R.Veldhuizen, T. Adorjan, EU Introduces Plans Regarding a Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System, European 
Taxation, cit., at 525-526.  
41 COM(2015)302 final, A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action, cit., 
at 14. 
       These desired achievements can thus be taken as a benchmarks, against which the 
proposals of academic literature can also be assessed comparatively with the short-term 
measures proposed by the Commission.  
 3. The proposals by literature  
       Just as the Commission, academic literature has also been taking as a starting point 
that the existing corporate tax systems are no longer suitable to the current economic 
reality, but has been proposing different solutions. Three proposals, in particular, 
appear to suggest a radical departure from the current rules, and can be assessed against 
the objectives set out by the Commission.   
3.1.  The destination-based corporation tax (DBCT) proposal.    
    A first idea is a destination-based corporation tax (DBCT)42, according to which 
sales should becoming a connecting factor for tax jurisdiction43 .  The DBCT idea takes 
sales destination as a place of relative immobility, due to customers being less mobile 
than business activities. Its proponents argued that,  in a globalized economy - where 
capitals freely move from one country to another - the very fundamentals of the 
international tax system need to be re-examined by overcoming the distinction between 
residence and source, and by choosing a new connecting factor.   
      According to the DBCT proponents44, the country  where the customer is based,  
would be entitled to tax the company’s profits essentially for three reasons: sales are 
the ultimate origin of profit, and without sales there would be no taxable income; it is 
the country of the “income-origin activity” and, as such, its entitlement to tax would 
steam even from the principle of territoriality under international law; as country where 
consumers are based, it provides services which indirectly contribute to the generation 
of income.  The destination country would also be able to exercise enforcement 
jurisdiction,  simply by delegating the collection of the tax to the country where goods 
are produced, which is supposed to be the residence country, through a “one-stop-shop” 
approach. The proponents argue that this second country could require the company to 
declare the destination of its outputs, and then collect the tax, by applying the 
destination country tax rate, and pass the revenue to the destination country itself: in 
                                                          
42 M. Devereux, R. de la Feria, Designing and Implementing a destination-based corporation tax, WP 14/07, May 2014  
43 For similar earlier suggestions:  R. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State, 2000 Harvard Law Review  113(7), 1573-1676, at 1670-1671; A. Auerbach, M. Devereux and H. Simpson, “Taxing 
Corporate Income” in J. Mirrlees et al (eds.), Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 837-893; A. Auerbach and M. Devereux, “Consumption and Cash Flow Taxes in an International 
Setting” (2012) Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series,  WP 12/14.  
44  M. Devereux, R. de la Feria, Designing and Implementing a destination-based corporation tax, cit., 13.  
the end, the tax authorities of both country could do an aggregate reconciliation across 
all transactions in a given tax year45. The collecting country would then be allowed to 
charge a fee for collection,  which may be a small proportion of total revenue 
collected46.   
     Undoubtedly,  by linking the tax base to the market destination, the DBCT would 
manage to make the tax base inelastic and far more immovable than in the current legal 
order. This inelastic and immovable tax base would also manage to stabilize revenues, 
due to the overcoming of the problem of “profit shifting”, and to create a fair and level 
playing field throughout the EU, due to the irrelevance of the place of residence and, 
consequently, the irrelevance of the corporate tax rate in that jurisdiction. 
      The DBCT suggestion - due to its very being based on a stable sales-destination 
connecting factor - instead of the place where the activity is carried on,  would also 
eliminate the scope for the wider definition of PE recommended by the Commission in 
the context of the A.T.A.P.47, for the implementation of the OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines, which the Commission, as stated in a  communication accompanying the 
A.T.A.P., wishes to ensure48, and for most of the measures indicated in the proposed 
Anti-Avoidance Tax Directive49 too.  Specifically, with regard to the provisions of the 
proposed Anti-Avoidance Tax Directive, only the limitation of deduction of interests 
on intra-group borrowing50, and the anti-hybrid mismatch arrangement provision51, 
would make sense. This because a group company selling in a high-tax jurisdiction 
(and subject to tax there) could still - without a rule limiting interests deduction - reduce 
the tax base, in this jurisdiction, through excessive interest payments to another group 
company having its market base in a low-tax jurisdiction. Moreover, an intergroup 
payment made by a company having its market in a high tax jurisdiction to another 
company having its market in a lower tax-jurisdiction, and which were deductible in 
the first jurisdiction but exempt in the second one, would still lead to double non-
taxation. 
    None of the other conducts targeted by the proposed Anti-Avoidance Directive 
would manage any more to shift the tax base once – in a DBCT regime – the allocation 
of the tax base were completely unrelated to the residence or to the location of a PE. 
Exit taxation, switch-over clause, CFC rules, and the GAAR, would thus lose their 
                                                          
45 Id., 20 
46 Id, 21 
47 C(2016)271final, cit., Art. 3 
48 COM(2016) 23/2, cit., at 5 
49 COM(2016)26final, cit.; retro, par. 2 
50 Id., Art. 4 
51 Id., Art. 10 
scope.  The introduction of a measure to allow the cross-border losses offsetting would 
also become meaningless, due to the very adoption of an exclusive sales-destination 
based tax base.  The exclusive taxing nexus with the sales destination country would 
also eliminate any scope for an automatic exchange of information concerning APAs 
and “cross-border tax rulings”.   
    A CbCR would still find its scope, as it could assist national tax authorities of sales-
destination countries in cross-checking the accuracy of sales figures and of taxable 
profits amounts.  It would have to indicate, for each country, the amount of sales, the 
taxable profits, and the tax due.  As the residence country would be, in the suggestion, 
the “enforcement jurisdiction”, the CbCR would still need to be transmitted to this 
country tax authority, which, in turn, would need to transmit it to each sales destination 
country tax authority.   
     In fact, in this proposal, the residence country, via the “one-stop-shop” mechanism, 
would still have a role in tax collection on behalf of the destination country.  However, 
the DBCT proposal could end up charging a residence state A with the task of acting 
as tax collector for a destination country B – for any corporate taxpayer resident in 
State A and selling in country B – without a reciprocity condition. In fact, the 
possibility of reciprocity would be entirely outside the control of individual countries’ 
legislators and tax authorities, because it would end up depending only on market 
demands and thus on the presence of taxpayers resident in country B and selling in 
country A for comparable amounts leading to similar tax revenues.  The fee for 
collection that would be charged by the residence country should at least cover the 
costs incurred by its tax authority for the collection itself, but could certainly not lead 
to reciprocity. 
    Without reciprocity, in the event of dual tax residency under the domestic laws of 
country A and of country B52 , the allocation of tax residence would not bring revenue 
advantages to any of the two countries (tax residence being not a connecting factor for 
tax jurisdiction). Therefore, neither of the two countries would be particularly keen in 
being allocated the tax residence, and the “one-stop-shop” mechanism based on 
collection of revenues by the residence country on behalf of the destination sales 
country might not (necessarily) work. 
    Lastly, in a DBCT regime, a common strategy towards non-cooperative third 
countries would also still make sense: as companies based in third countries but having 
                                                          
52 A situation where the new Art. 4(3) of the OECD Model - as resulting from the changes indicated by the Final Report 
on Action 6 of the BEPS  - will require the two tax authorities to try to reach an agreement: OECD, Preventing the 
Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6: 2015 Final Report, p. 72. 
their market base within the EU would be taxable by the Member States where they 
sell their goods or services,  and vice-versa,  cooperation in the form of information 
exchange with third countries would be essential.  
 
3.2. The proposal for a “Corporate Tax 2.0”  
     Another academic proposal, which its Author considers a proposal for a “Corporate 
Tax 2.0.”, aims at suggesting -  for taxing multinationals in the global market – a new 
corporate tax system that should be based, within each state, on the concepts of equal 
treatment for taxpayers in the same economic circumstances, irrespective of 
residence53. The proposal argues that all economic operators with an economic 
presence (“nexus”) within the relevant taxing jurisdiction should be taxed on their 
worldwide business income, with a tax relief equal to the amount of the domestic tax 
attributable to the foreign income. According to the proposal, the “single tax principle” 
should be followed, to avoid both double taxation and double non-taxation, and the 
relevant taxing jurisdiction would be the geographical source most closely aligned with 
the income earned. In this suggestion,  the taxable base should consist of the “economic 
rent”, i.e. of the investment returns in excess of the normal returns on the production 
investments, and this taxable base should be determined by granting a deduction for 
equity financing.  
    As regards the taxable base, this proposal – just as the DBCT suggestion - would 
aim at allocating the taxing nexus to the countries where the multinational’s products 
or services would be effectively sold. The “taxing nexus” would be allocated to the 
market jurisdictions where sales exceed a quantitative turnover threshold.  The taxable 
unit would be the group as a multinational enterprise, and the ultimate parent company 
would act as “principal taxpayer” for corporate tax assessment purposes toward her 
taxing jurisdiction, and would receive the tax assessment.     
    This proposal would have, in common with the CCCTB, the “one-stop-shop” 
approach and the existence of a “principal taxpayer”, but – unlike the CCCTB, and 
similarly to the DBCT – would completely overcome the current international tax 
framework based on “residence” and “source”,  on the “PE”,  etc.. Undoubtedly, even 
this proposal - just as the DBCT – would manage to make the tax base inelastic,  by 
linking the tax base to the market destination, and far more immovable than in the 
current legal order.  All the advantages that the DBCT would bring in terms of 
                                                          
53 M. de Wilde, ‘Sharing the Pie’: Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market,  in 43 Intertax, vol. 6 and 7, 2015, 438-
446. 
stabilization of tax revenues, would obviously be generated by the “corporate tax 2.0” 
proposal as well.  
        On the other hand, unlike in the DBCT suggestion, in this proposal – due to 
taxation being subject to sales exceeding a certain turnover -  there would be the risk 
of no taxation at all in case of profits below this turnover.  This would be consistent 
with the idea of taxing only “economic rents”, i.e. the parts exceeding a normal rate of 
return.    However, assuming that this proposal were to be considered within the EU, a 
choice of taxing only “economic rents”, and the related risk of  no taxation at all for 
the part of the profits below the taxing threshold, would be difficult to reconcile with 
the Commission’s stated objective to avoid double non-taxation54.  Moreover, this 
choice would give rise to the question as to whether – to avoid the setting of excessively 
different normal rate of returns by the different Member States – an EU legislative 
measure should harmonize the determination of the “normal rate of returns” (and thus, 
indirectly, the determination of economic rents), e.g., by setting a range between 
minimum and maximum rates to be applied to different economic sectors.   
     It would seem, in fact, appropriate to avoid large differences between one country 
and another in the determination of the taxing thresholds, particularly if the level of 
“economic rents”  were to depend on an harmonized level of normal rate of returns. In 
fact, because taxation would only concern the “economic rents” , excessive disparities 
in the taxing thresholds would, in some countries setting the lowest taxing thresholds, 
risk resulting in a taxation of “normal returns” that the proposals aims at avoiding.  
     For profits exceeding the taxing threshold, the risk of double non-taxation would be 
eliminated, but the “one-stop-shop” system would be difficult to implement,  and so 
would be the role of “principal taxpayer” by the ultimate parent company, because it 
would be necessary, in each jurisdiction, to report the worldwide profit and then to 
apply the tax relief for foreign profit.  This proposal would not seem, for this reason, 
to be able to achieve one of the objectives that drove the Commission to pursue the 
CCCTB: the administrative simplification of cross-border corporate tax compliance.   
    However, the “corporate tax 2.0” suggestion  could be revised to maintain its current 
strengths, and, at the same time, to eliminate the risk of no taxation.  For this last 
purpose, it would be sufficient to suggest the taxation, in each country where the group 
sells its product or services, only of the share of the overall profits arising from sales 
in that country through a territorial taxation system, instead of a worldwide taxation 
coupled with foreign tax credit.  This would really lead to a “fractional taxation”, and 
                                                          
54 Stated by the Commission in several occasions, including in the Explanatory Memorandum of  COM(2016) 26 final, 
2016/0011, at p. 3 
– as the system would  not be based on a worldwide taxation - it would require no tax 
credit for foreign profits.  That would also make the suggestion effective from the 
perspective of achieving administrative simplification in tax compliance.        
   In any case, the implementation of the “corporate tax 2.0” proposal would obviously 
require, on a yearly bases, an automatic exchange of information concerning sales of 
each group (and of each company belonging to each group) in each EU country, and it 
would be necessary to establish whether the information flow should go from the 
country where most of the sales are directed to all other destination-based taxing 
jurisdictions. 
     Amongst the short term initiatives proposed by the Commission55,  the “corporate 
tax 2.0” proposal would make it purposeless the adjustment of the definition of PE and 
the same provisions of the Anti-Avoidance Tax Directive that would be made 
purposeless by the DBCT56. The introduction of a measure to allow the cross-border 
losses offsetting, would lose their scope, due to the very adoption of a sales-destination 
based tax base. Again, this tax base allocation would also imply that transfer pricing 
issues would no longer arise, and that the automatic exchange of information on 
transfer pricing rulings would also lose its scope.  
    The Commission’s intention about ensuring transparency and strengthening 
cooperation between tax authorities would still make sense, but it would have to refer 
to the sales of each group in each country within the EU. This would be consistent, on 
the other hand, with the intention to require further information from multinationals, 
including a CbCR.  Arguably, the CbCR would have to be submitted by the parent 
company – in a “corporate tax 2.0” scenario – not to its residence country (unlike in a 
DBCT scenario), but to its market-based main taxing jurisdiction, and would have to 
be sent by this jurisdiction to all other jurisdictions where the parent company itself, 
and other group units, sell their products and/or services. 
        Lastly, if the “corporate tax 2.0” were implemented, the concern, expressed by the 
Commission, to ensure that there is a link between tax benefits and the activities which 
they are intended to encourage (such as “patent boxes” for R&D activities) would still 
make sense, provided the tax benefits were granted – for the “economic rents” - by the 
market jurisdiction (as this would be the origin of profits).  
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3.3. The NCCTB proposal 
     A further academic proposal consists of a “new common corporate tax base” 
(NCCTB)57,  which distinguishes again between normal rate of returns and residual 
profits, on the assumption that it has been much easier for Governments and tax 
authorities to tax routine profits of multinationals than to tax residual profits58.   The 
proponent suggests that the taxation of corporate profits should take place at two levels: 
at national level for the profits that correspond to a normal rate of returns on the 
investments made by the enterprise and its shareholders (which would represent a 
return on routine functions); at EU level, for the residual profit which cannot be easily 
linked to the functions carried out within a multinational enterprise or easily allocated 
to different jurisdictions, i.e. for profits such as those deriving from the creation, 
management and exploitation of intellectual property.   
     The NCCTB idea refers to the taxation of profits corresponding to the normal rate 
of return, and the tax base would be determined by only applying a cost-plus approach. 
This because low-risk or routine functions are typically remunerated on the bases of 
the arms’ length profit, which is based either on the cost-plus method (CP) or on a 
relatively small spread on the taxpayer’s individual turnover59.  
    Several reasons were indicated for using a harmonized CP tax base: the application 
by all Member States of a CP approach in determining the tax base would avoid the 
risk of double taxation on profits deriving from routine functions within the EU; a 
company’s cost base is much more difficult to manipulate than a company’s turnover 
and is a measure of the economic presence of a company in a jurisdiction; it would be 
far less complex as a system than the current ones and would provide advanced 
certainty; it would result in acceptable effective tax rates; it would be difficult to avoid, 
and Member States would remain free to apply their preferred amount of markup and 
of corporate tax rates.  The cost base – to be used for determining the NCCTB – would 
exclude costs items such as interest expenses and intercompany payments, which, in 
the current systems, give rise to base erosion and profit shifting, and to transfer pricing 
issues. The NCCTB would thus focus only on external expenses, i.e. on direct and 
indirect expenses, i.e. on operating expenses, general, legal and administrative 
expenses, paid to third parties, irrespective of  whether these expenses, borne by a 
group company in a Member State, should economically be allocated in whole or in 
part to another group company in another Member State.   
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    It was  argued that a NCCTB along these lines would eliminate all issues which were 
indicated in the BEPS Action Plan60, and that the application of the NCCTB would be 
easier than the application of the CCCTB, because the NCCTB would not need an 
apportionment formula given that the cost base of the NCCTB, free from intercompany 
expenses, is a formula in itself. Specifically,  in case of multinational groups with 
subsidiaries and branches in more Member States, the taxpayer would be identified, in 
each Member State, by aggregating all the cost bases of all group companies resident 
in a given Member State and local branches of non-resident companies. All these group 
units would become a single aggregate corporate taxpayer (on behalf of the 
multinational enterprise) toward that Member State, and one of the companies resident 
in that Member State would file the aggregate corporate tax return – based on the CP 
method – on behalf of all of them.  There would thus be a “one-stop-shop” approach 
within any single Member State for the fulfillment of tax obligation of the (aggregate) 
taxpayer operating in its jurisdiction, and not – unlike the CCCTB – a “one-stop-shop” 
for the entire group in the Member State of residence of the parent company. 
    Even more importantly, due to the CP tax base and to the aggregation of tax base for 
each country where the multinational group operates, there would be neither cross-
border consolidation nor apportionment.   Each Member State would have a positive 
corporate tax base due to the very determination of the NCCTB and to the identification 
of the taxpayer; the proponent highlight that this would avoid the issue of intra-EU 
cross-border losses and of distortions between purely domestic activities and EU cross-
border activities.   
   
3.4. The NCCTB proposal vs. the CCCTB and vs. the shorter-term initiatives proposed 
by the Commission 
    If the NCCTB proposal is compared with the Commission’s idea for a staged 
implementation of a mandatory CCCTB – started with a common tax base - and with 
the other Commission’s proposals, the NCCTB suggestion shows specific advantages 
and a potential disadvantage. 
     Firstly,  the  NCCTB – thanks to its cost base whose geographical location would 
be much more immobile than that of the current profit-based tax bases – would lead to 
greater revenue stability than the measures proposed in the 2015 Action Plan, and in 
the A.T.A.P.,  which are based on the current international tax framework and which 
therefore still assume a profit-based tax base. The NCCTB’s possibility of resulting in 
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a fair and level playing field for businesses would inevitably depend on each business 
sector, accordingly to whether the differences in cost bases would be greater or smaller 
from one Member State to another. However, even in case of considerable differences 
in the cost bases, those differences could be partly neutralized if Member States agreed 
to coordinate with each other in applying mark-up measures that were inversely 
proportional to the cost bases. This coordination would lead - due to the CP method – 
to similar tax bases, and, ultimately, to a level playing field at least as far as the tax 
bases were concerned.  This outcome would be comparable to that of a common tax 
base, but the NCCCTB - due to its eliminating the risk of profits shifting and of transfer 
pricing adjustments, even without the need for a cross-border consolidation -  would 
certainly be far more effective than a common tax base, and, unlike the CCCTB, it 
could be implemented in one single stage.  
   The greater effectiveness of the NCCTB than a common tax base would derive from 
the fact that the common tax base, without the consolidation, would still need to rely 
on the arm’s length principle (separate enterprises): thus, it would not manage to avoid 
the profit shifting issues and the transfer pricing disputes which the application of this 
principle has been generating up to present.  On the other hand, a common tax base – 
by leaving unaltered the competition on tax rates – would make more transparent the 
differences between the effective tax burden deriving from differences in the nominal 
tax rates, and would thus risk even encouraging profits shifting to the lower-tax 
jurisdictions. This would paradoxically risk occurring at the same time as the 
Commission acknowledges that differences in corporate taxation between countries are 
the driving force for corporate profits shifting61.  The NCCTB – by leaving to national 
tax jurisdictions only the application of tax rates on normal profits – would have the 
merit of eliminating the tax competition (and with it the risk of profits shifting) as 
regards the residual profits (which latter, according to the proposal, should be subject 
to tax at EU level).  The importance of this aspect can be easily appreciated by 
considering that, in recent years, the well-known cases of tax planning strategies within 
the EU involving major US multinationals – cases such as Starbucks, Google, Apple, 
Amazon, etc.. -  typically saw, through intra-group licensing arrangements,  the shifting 
of profits arising out of the exploitation of intellectual property rights to group 
subsidiaries resident in low tax or no tax jurisdictions. There was thus, in these cases, 
a shifting of “residual profits”, in the terminology of the NCCTB proposal. Had the 
NCCTB been applied within the EU, such cases would obviously have not occurred.  
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   Secondly, the  NCCTB – due to its determining a positive corporate tax base within 
any individual Member State where a multinational group operates62 –would require 
less effort than the strategy63  consisting of a common tax base accompanied by a 
measure on cross-border loss relief.  Nonetheless, the efficiency gain that the NCCTB 
would bring about in this respect may be offset by a loss from the viewpoint of fairness 
in taxation (another objective pursued by the Commission).  Specifically, the 
Commission’s intention of introducing – in parallel with a common tax base – a 
measure to allow cross-border loss offsetting between parent companies and 
subsidiaries, as well as between head office and branches,  considers that cross-border 
losses ultimately reduce the ability-to-pay  tax  of either the company (considered as a 
legal entity including head office and PE) or the group as an economic unity.     
   Conversely, in the NCCTB suggestion, at least as currently formulated, a situation 
where a company bears costs higher than the actual revenues - i.e. a situation where a 
company actually suffers a loss instead of a normal profit - does not seem to be taken 
into account.  In turn, this could lead to the taxation of a (partially) overestimated 
profits in the hand of the “aggregate taxpayer”, a situation which would be at odd with 
the ability-to-pay principle and  would also certainly not be consistent with the EU’s 
objective of pursuing the (economic) well-being of its people. This objective is stated 
in Art.  3(1) of the TFEU, and should be interpreted as requiring (cross-border) loss 
relief64.  The risk of taxing a partially fictitious profits could be avoided (in a new 
version of the proposal) simply by excluding, from the aggregation, the companies 
suffering an actual loss, and for which thus the application of the markup would end 
up determining a wholly fictitious profit.   
     If the NCCTB approach were to be followed,  due to the transfer pricing problem 
being overcome altogether, the automatic exchange of information on APA65 would no 
longer find its scope. The automatic exchange of  “advance cross-border rulings” could 
still apply, as regards the exchange relating to rulings concerning the existence of a  PE 
in another jurisdiction66,  only if this were made relevant for verifying the existence and 
the amount of costs incurred in that other jurisdiction, and therefore for determining 
the cost base of that other jurisdiction.   Equally, the adjustment of the definition of PE 
suggested by the Commission in the Recommendation included in the A.T.A.P.67 – 
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which would be intended to prevent artificial avoidance of the  source country taxation 
– would  still make sense  only if  the existence of a PE were made relevant in 
determining the cost base. In this case,  the “advance cross-border rulings” to be 
exchanged under the amended Administrative Cooperation Directive68, and relating to 
the existence of a PE, would all need to be consistent with the adjusted definition of 
PE, and consistent with each other.   
       None of the provisions that would be introduced by the proposed Anti-Avoidance 
Directive69  should also apply. In fact,  the CP base – by assuming the cost elements 
borne in a given Member State – would completely imply a territorial taxation system 
instead of a worldwide taxation system (and an entirely territorial taxation system 
would not leave scope for CFC rules and for switch-over clauses), and the markup from 
the CP, together with the exclusion of intra-group expenses, would leave no scope for 
interest limitation rules and for consideration of intra-group hybrid payments.  
Residence transfers would also become immaterial – and exit taxation would lose its 
scope – if the outgoing company still bears all costs in its original jurisdiction due to 
its business activity being still entirely carried out there70 (e.g., through a branch).   
   On the contrary, the automatic exchange of information on CbCR71  would still be 
useful, for each national tax authority to be able to cross-check the tax returns submitted 
by each “aggregate taxpayer” and the information contained in the CbCR.  However, 
the  CbCR, unlike the one produced in the context of the current tax framework, would 
be unrelated to transfer pricing, and would need to be produced, for all the group, by 
assembling the information (in terms of normal profit and of tax paid) concerning each 
“aggregate taxpayer” (i.e, of the taxpayer resulting from the aggregation of all cost 
bases of group companies and local branches) in each country.  
    In the context of the NCCTB, it would also be possible to ensure and preserve the 
territorial link between preferential tax regimes, e.g. “patent boxes”, and underlying 
R&D economic activities that they are supposed to encourage, according to the 
“modified nexus approach” of which the Commission stated the intention to monitor 
the implementation by Member States72. It would be sufficient to apply, in any 
jurisdiction, either a reduced mark-up to costs incurred there in relation to the 
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development of intellectual property or a reduced tax rate to the normal profit 
specifically derived from this activities.   
   Overall, the NCCTB suggestion – in its assuming a cost base with a markup for a 
“normal profit” – would certainly be attractive in term of simplicity, and, in being based 
on a “one-stop-shop” system in each country for the “aggregate taxpayer” carrying on 
activity in that country, it could also be effectively administered. Thanks to the one-
stop-shop system, and the cost base, the NCCTB,  by reducing the possibility of profit 
shifting, would also minimize the impact of differences in taxation (from one country 
to another) on taxpayers’ investments decisions. 
    As above argued, the NCCTB would make meaningless not only much of the actions 
indicated in the BEPS Action Plan, but also nearly all of the proposed initiatives set 
out by the Commission in its 2015 Action Plan and in the A.T.A.P., as it would offer 
an alternative route to achieve the same objectives. 
            
4. The Commission’s intentions vs. the academic proposals: the scope for 
rethinking the fundamentals of the current international tax order     
  
     From the foregoing, it can be easily deduced that all three suggestions – due to the 
very connecting factors that they take, i.e. the costs (NCCTB) or the sales destination 
markets (“corporate tax 2.0” and DBCT) – would make meaningless, for corporate 
taxation purposes,  the current Articles 4(3)73, 574, 775 and 976 of DTCs based on the 
OECD Model.      
     Amongst the Commission’s intended five areas of work as laid down in the June 
2015 Action Plan, the Commission’s intentions which would still find their scope are 
to bring taxation closer to the place where they are generated,  and to improve tax 
transparency77.  The academic suggestions can also be considered from the viewpoint 
of their consistency with these intentions.     
 
4.1.  Bringing the taxation of profits closer to the place where profits are generated 
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    The Commission’s intention to bring taxation of profits closer to the place where 
they are generated, is completely consistent with these academic suggestions: the only 
difference appears to lie in a different conception about the place where profits are 
generated and where, therefore, the taxable base should be allocated. 
   According to the Commission, profits are generated where the activity takes place78, 
but neither the Action Plan nor the A.T.A.P indicate where a company is regarded as 
having its economic activity, i.e. the Commission has not expressly set out a specific 
test for establishing what are the indicators of economic activity being carried out in a 
given country.  
    Arguably, if and when the CCCTB comes into force, the apportionment formula 
based on labor, assets and sales79 -  if it were to be maintained as proposed in the first 
2011 proposal80 - would also suggest that the business activity is carried out, pro-quota, 
in all Member States where these factors exist. Nonetheless,  given the Commission’s 
intention to proceed with a staged implementation of the CCCTB starting from a 
common tax base without consolidation - and given the further possibility of 
amendments in the final CCCTB proposal -  the 2011 version of the CCCTB proposal 
does not currently appear to be able to offer a definitive indication as to whether the 
criteria for identifying the location of the business activity will remain those suggested 
by the apportionment formula laid down at that time.   
     Indirectly, an indication about when a genuine economic activity takes place, would 
seem to emerge from the proposed Anti-Avoidance Directive81. This excludes the 
application of CFC rules to an entity which is tax resident in a Member State or in a 
third country belonging to the EEA or in respect of a PE of a third country entity in a 
Member State, unless the entity is wholly artificial, or unless the entity engages, in the 
course of its activity, in non-genuine arrangements having the essential purpose of 
obtaining a tax advantage82.   
    The first situation (wholly artificial entity) appears to be fully consistent with the 
ECJ’s position in the 2006 Cadbury Schweppes ruling83:  here, the ECJ specified that, 
only if checking elements such as the physical existence of a subsidiary - in terms of 
premises, staff and equipment - leads to the finding that the subsidiary does not carry 
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out any genuine economic activity in the territory of the host country, the creation of 
this subsidiary must be regarded as a wholly artificial arrangement84 and the application 
of CFC rules by the state of residence of the parent company would be justified85. The 
choice, in the proposed Anti-Avoidance Directive, to allow the application of CFC 
rules to the case of wholly artificial entities, suggests that, in the Commission’s 
conception underlying the A.T.A.P., the place where a company is regarded as having 
its economic activity coincides with the concept of genuine economic activity 
emerging from this ECJ case-law.  
   However,  the second situation (i.e. the case of an entity carrying out non-genuine 
arrangements) – given the definition of non-genuine arrangements86 -  would seem to  
contravene the ECJ’s findings.  In fact, the Commission, in defining the non-genuine 
arrangements, appears to have regard, ultimately, to the fact that the activities 
corresponding to the profits of the subsidiary could be directly carried out by the parent 
company87.  On the contrary, in Cadbury Schweppes, the ECJ clarified that such a 
situation would not warrant the conclusion that there is a wholly artificial 
arrangement88.  This part of the proposed Anti-Avoidance Tax Directive could 
therefore generate doubts as to whether the Commission intends restricting the concept 
of “place where the business activity is carried out” in comparison with the Cadbury 
Schweppes finding.  Therefore, the lack -  in the Action Plan and in the A.T.A.P. – of 
a precise definition of “place where the business activity is carried on”,  would seem 
to leave uncertainty on this fundamental element of the overall Commission’s strategy.       
       Moreover, the “place where the business activity is carried on” cannot be regarded 
as the top decision-making center, which, in essence, coincides with the “place of 
effective management” (POEM)89.  which has been serving as tie-breaker rule for tax 
residence under Art. 4(3) of DTCs based on the OECD Model90.   
    The POEM criteria historically traces its origin from UK case-law developed since 
the end of the XIX century, under which the place where the business activity is carried 
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on is the place where the key decisions are taken91, i.e. where the “controlling brain” 
of the company is located92.  If the “place where the business activity is carried on” 
were to be regarded as synonymous of POEM and if or when the POEM remains 
decisive in determining the tax residence93,  the concern expressed by the Commission 
(to re-establishing the link between taxation and where the economic activity takes 
place), would be meaningless, because, currently, the tax residence country always 
taxes a company due to the very existence of the residence connecting factor.  
Consequently, this concern makes sense whenever there is the risk of taxation being 
escaped in the country (different from the tax residence country) where profits 
originate.   
     It is significant, in this regard, that the broadening of the definition of PE, which 
would follow from the Recommendation included in the A.T.A.P.94, would imply a 
broadening of taxing rights for the source country, and a corresponding restriction of 
the taxing rights of the residence country (which latter would have to give tax credit 
for a wider range of cases giving rise to a PE).  
    In addition, there is at least one situation where the current national tax residence in 
itself, as a connecting factor for corporate taxation, is arguably in contrast with the 
objective of rebuilding the link between taxation and the place where companies really 
make their profits, i.e. the place (according to the Commission) where economic 
activity takes place.  This situation occurs when no economic activity takes place in the 
residence country as currently identified.    
   In this situation, whenever the tax residence country still applies the worldwide 
taxation principle, the tax liability in the residence country – although accompanied 
normally by the tax credit for tax paid in the source country – results in reporting and 
payment obligations in two countries, for tax relating to the same profits. Therefore, 
worldwide taxation may incentivize strategies to escape taxation in the source country, 
(to avoid the threshold of the taxable presence there, and thus to reduce the overall 
compliance costs), and the most effective route to pursue the objective stated by the 
Commission would be the allocation of exclusive taxing rights to the source country.  
      “Source” may be assumed to coincide – for the purpose of the Commission’s 
objective of rebuilding the link between taxation and where profits are generated -  
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with the “origin” of profits95.  Therefore, exclusive source taxation would be 
completely consistent  with the academic proposals above discussed. It would have in 
common with the NCCTB proposal both the ultimate concern and the location of the 
activity as a connecting nexus (the NCCTB proposal would consider the activity to 
take place where the company incurs costs). It would have in common with the DBCT 
and with the “corporate tax 2.0” proposal only the concern the reconnect taxation with  
the place where profits are made, as these two last suggestions propose a connecting 
nexus that, due to its being linked to consumers demand,  is expected, by its very nature, 
to be immovable or, at least, to be more stable than business activities.   
          Alternatively - in view of the stated objective – it would make sense to 
reformulate the concept of corporate tax residence,  by accepting the idea, that was 
considered in a 2001 OECD discussion draft96, of taking the “place where the economic 
nexus is strongest”97 as a (new) criteria for tax residence. That discussion draft 
mentioned land, labor, capital and enterprise  (the factors of production) used by the 
company in deriving its profits, and the idea of using these elements to determine to 
which State the company has the strongest ties to deem the company to be resident 
only in that State. As the country where the company uses its factors of production is 
also a country in which it incurs costs, that idea would be consistent with the NCCTB 
suggestion of taking costs as indicators of the economic presence of a company in a 
jurisdiction.    
      If the concept of tax residence were reformulated to reflect the place of the strongest 
economic nexus, a dual adjustment to the current definition of PE would also be 
appropriate.   
      The range of cases giving rise to a PE could certainly be broadened (as indicated 
by the Commission Recommendation included in the A.T.A.P.)98  to situations – such 
“commissionaire arrangements” – where the economic activity is carried out in forms 
which are different from the examples listed in Art. 5(1) of the OECD Model and from 
the “agency PE” in Art. 5(5), but which show a clear link with the territory of the 
concerned jurisdiction.  Nonetheless,  the definition itself of PE as a fixed place of 
business as it currently reads under Art. 5(1) – which refers to “wholly or partly of the 
activity of an enterprise” - would need to be restricted only to a part of the activity. In 
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fact, if the whole of the business activity was carried out in a country, that country 
could no longer be a country of location of a PE, having a concurrent taxing right, but 
it would need to become the jurisdiction having the exclusive connecting factor for 
taxation (i.e., the reformulated residence connecting factor, which, however, would no 
longer be different from the source connecting factor).   
      Overall, the DBCT idea, the “corporate tax 2.0” suggestion and the NCCTB 
suggestion – in addition to being all completely in line with the Commission’s intention 
to safeguard the taxing right of the source country – offer a precise response to the 
issue as to where the ultimate origin of profits can be located. In so doing, in essence 
all of them suggest connecting factors which, due to their very nature, would logically 
lead to exclusive taxing rights, and may thus offer the occasion, for the Commission,  
to consider again: whether the ultimate originator of business profits can be identified 
in the production or in the sale of goods or services; whether the tax base most immune 
to the risk of profit shifting (that the Commission wishes to avoid) should be based on 
the destination market or on the location of the activity, and, in this last case, whether 
a cost base (as in the NCCTB) would be the most reliable and immovable indicator.  
    Arguably, taking the cost base as the most reliable indicator of the carrying out of 
the business activity in a given jurisdiction, and of the origin of profits there, would be 
consistent with the ECJ’s indication, in Cadbury Schweppes, of the presence of 
premises, staff and equipment as elements proving a genuine economic activity99, to 
the extent that the investments in premises, staff and equipment have been made in the 
jurisdiction at stake.     
   On the other hand, taking the market base as the origin of profits would not contradict 
this ECJ’s Cadbury Schweppes finding as an indication of a genuine exercise of the 
freedom of establishment,  but would simply eliminate the scope for tax planning 
strategies consisting of transferring the tax residence – as currently identified - to low-
tax jurisdictions, even where this transfer is protected by the freedom of establishment  
due to a genuine economic activity in the destination State100.    
     The Commission - consistently with its highlighting that tax residence transfers 
distort the market by eroding the tax base of the State of departure and shifting future 
profits to be taxed in the low-tax jurisdiction of destination101 -  in the draft anti-tax 
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avoidance Directive proposed the introduction of exit taxes102, among other measures 
intended to protect domestic corporate tax bases.  
     It was indeed suggested that multinational companies should be taxed in their 
residence country and that their ability to move should be restricted by using corporate 
exit taxation, on the ground that 90% of multinationals are currently headquartered in 
G20 countries, and that none of these countries have a corporate tax rate below 20%, 
so that what would be required (to protect the tax base) would be a coordination only 
between some 20 jurisdictions103.   Nonetheless, this suggestion would not seem to 
consider that, within the EU,  corporate tax rates range from 10% to over 33%, and 
Member States not belonging to the G20 group104 have proven to be a very attractive 
location for multinationals to be tax resident there.   
     Moreover,  the Commission itself had to take into account that a tax residence 
transfer within the EU, or toward a EEA country, would be protected by the freedom 
of establishment ex Arts. 49 and 54 T.F.E.U under the ECJ case-law105. For this reason, 
consistently with the ECJ case-law, the proposed exit taxation would allow outgoing 
taxpayer to defer the payment of the amount of the tax over at least five years106.  
     Consequently, the higher the difference in the effective corporate tax rate between 
the country of departure and the country of destination, the  less effective exit taxes (to 
be paid in instalments over at least 5 years) would be in discouraging such a tax 
residence transfer, even when the market base remains in the State of departure.   
    Taking the market base as an indicator of the ultimate origin of the profits would, 
therefore, be far more effective than exit taxes in protecting the corporate tax base of 
this State.  Obviously, a market-based allocation of tax jurisdiction would also make 
completely useless for individual countries to compete with each other for attracting 
companies even through those special regimes that were politically banned by the Code 
of Good Conduct on Business Taxation,  and would thus make it no longer necessary 
the (extension of) the mandate of this Code, that the Commission intends proposing107. 
4.2.  Improving tax transparency 
                                                          
102 Id., Art. 5.  
103 R.S. Avi-Yonah,  The International Tax Regime: A Centennial Reconsideration, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 462, June 2015 
104 Such as Ireland.  
105 COM(2016)26final, cit.,  at p. 8  
106 Id., at p. 8 and p. 17. This would be necessary for consistency with the ECJ’s ruling in Case C-371/10, National Grid 
Indus [2011] ECR I-12273 
107 Retro, par. 2 
    As already mentioned, if the academic proposals were to be taken forward,  there 
would still need to be exchange of information as regards tax authorities108.  
   In the Commission’s proposal for a Directive amending the Administrative 
Cooperation Directive, tax residence plays a key role in the direction of information 
that should be automatically exchanged109, but the proposal does not contain a 
definition of corporate tax residence.  Neither is such a definition included in the 
proposed Anti-Avoidance Directive, although this hugely relies on the tax residence 
concept,  e.g. in providing for exit taxes on the transfer of the tax residence and in 
setting CFC rules110.  Seemingly, the Commission took it for granted that corporate tax 
residence could be always determined, by relying on the definition of tax residence 
under national laws111 and under double tax conventions (DTCs) based on the OECD 
Model.  
   Nevertheless, literature  has been highlighting the difficulty in determining corporate 
tax residence. Whereas formalistic rules such as the place of incorporation are 
vulnerable to manipulation in both traditional and electronic commerce environments, 
other rules such as the “place of central management and control” and the POEM test 
risk being ineffective in a computerized environment112 (where top management 
functions can well be decentralized through electronic communication means).  Even 
after the changes to Art. 4(3) of the OECD Model and to the Commentary that will 
follow from the Final Report on Action 6 of the BEPS plan113, this issue might remain. 
In fact, on the one hand the agreement that the tax authorities shall endeavor to reach 
on the tax residence should still take into account the POEM and the place of 
registration114, and on the other hand States wishing to continue using the POEM as a 
tie-breaker rule could still do so115. The new provision, whereby without an agreement 
between the two tax authorities on the determination of the tax residence the concerned 
company is not entitled to any relief or exemption provided under the DTC116, may 
certain increase the interest of a dual resident company for the solution of the tax 
residence conflict, but it does not guarantee the solution if the mutual agreement 
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procedure (MAP) in the DTC at stake does not contain a mandatory arbitration clause. 
Therefore, the risk of unresolved tax residence conflict is not bound to disappear.   
     In a situation of unresolved tax residence conflict, it would become virtually 
impossible to apply the provisions on automatic information exchange, including the 
provisions proposed by the Commission in its draft Directive requiring the exchange 
on CbCR117 (as well as the provisions proposed in its draft Anti-Avoidance 
Directive118).  In fact, unless the tax residence conflict is resolved  before the scheduled 
timing for the automatic exchange of information, each of the concerned country – in 
light of its internal legislation – might consider itself as entitled to receive the CbCR 
from the parent company and to transmit it to other national tax authorities, rather than 
being entitled to receive it from another national tax authority.  
    In the case of a CbCR that – by assumption – were to be applied in a  “corporate tax 
2.0” regime, the problem concerning difficulties in identifying the tax residence would 
not arise, as the country entitled to receive and transmit the CbCR  could be the country 
where most of the sales of this company are directed if the parent company is not a 
pure holding, or, otherwise, it could be the country where most of the overall sales of 
other groups’ subsidiaries are directed119.  Because the amount of sales destination per 
country would be a merely quantitative factor, it could in all cases be easily ascertained 
before the automatic transmission of information. This latter, therefore, could always 
take place (without the risk of tax residence conflicts hindering it). 
    Even from the viewpoint of tax transparency and of its effectiveness, the academic 
proposals would thus suggest a rethinking of a fundamental of the current international 
tax law order, such as the tax residence.      
  
  5. Another possible comprehensive solution (complementary to the CCCTB) for 
achieving a fair and efficient corporate tax system in the EU 
        The concepts of “fairness” and “efficiency” in taxation – which the Commission 
recalled in its 2015 Action Plan – are certainly not new, since, in essence, they trace 
back to well-known “Principles of taxation”120: equity,  whereby taxpayers should pay 
tax to the jurisdiction  which allows them to earn their income; neutrality, whereby 
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taxes should not influence economic decisions; certainty, whereby the time, the manner 
and the amount of payment ought to be clear to the taxpayer, convenience, whereby 
every tax (thus, including corporation tax) should be levied in a way which is most 
convenient for the contributor to pay it.   
     As regards the equity perspective,  if the contribution of a given jurisdiction to the 
generation of profits is the criteria for allocation of taxing rights,  it follows that only 
jurisdictions where profits are generated should have taxing rights. It was already 
argued by academic Authors that considerations of equity and efficiency, as a rule, 
support exclusive taxation in the source country121. The implication of the equity 
principle – in line, ultimately, with all academic suggestions above considered - would 
thus be: exclusive taxing rights should belong to the source countries, in proportion to 
the fraction of the overall companies’ profits arising within each of their jurisdictions.   
     Each source country could take into consideration the overall company’s ability-to-
pay – i.e., take into consideration also the profits gained or the losses suffered in other 
Member States – through the tax rates, without including foreign profits in its tax base 
and without deducting foreign losses.  Losses incurred in other Member States could 
therefore be taken into consideration by simply reducing the tax rates on profits gained 
in the concerned jurisdiction.  The scenario here suggested could become feasible in 
light of the fact that, over the last decade, some countries have been switching from 
worldwide taxation to territorial corporate taxation for companies that they consider 
their own tax residents.  Once the tax residence countries start giving up worldwide 
taxation and switching to territorial taxation,  the distinction between residence taxation 
and source taxation starts disappearing anyway.     
    Neutrality – and thus the lack of influence on economic decisions within the single 
market, which was already advocated in 1992 by the Ruding Report122 -  can, in turn, 
be achieved if the differences in corporate taxation regimes can no longer induce tax 
planning strategies and profit shifting.  Again, this is possible to a higher extent, the 
higher the extent to which: on the one hand, the taxable base is immovable from the 
jurisdiction in which profit originates;  on the other hand, there is an incentive for 
national legislators to converge toward each other’s regime. Accordingly, even from 
the viewpoint of neutrality, giving exclusive taxing rights to the jurisdictions where 
profits originate, and from which they would be most inseparable, would be the most 
effective choice.  
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   Certainty would surely be fostered by the Commission’s initiatives aimed at 
strengthening the cooperation between tax authorities123, because only this co-
operation  can offer (to any taxpayers receiving cross-border incomes) legal certainty 
as regards their reporting and payment obligations towards all concerned countries.  In 
this respect, the CCCTB project would go beyond the current level of administrative 
co-operation, as it would work through a  central database in which all information 
would be stored and immediately accessible124 and would thus result in multilateral 
sharing of information.  This latter would be more effective than bilateral automatic 
transmission of information,  given that it would allow tax authorities simultaneous 
access to information and would thus allow them an earlier settlement of any potential 
dispute, to the benefit of certainty for the concerned taxpayers.    
   Convenience – if read in respect of the fulfillment of cross-border tax obligations 
towards two or more jurisdictions - would be facilitated, undoubtedly, by the existence 
of a “one-stop-shop”, which would avoid the need for the concerned taxpayers to deal 
with several different national tax administrations.  The one-stop shop is in the CCCTB 
proposal and is also in the academic suggestions above considered. However, in the 
CCCTB proposal, it would be for the tax authority of the residence Member State of 
the parent company, i.e. for the principal tax authority (PTA), to act as a one-stop-shop 
for the fulfillment of all group’s tax related obligations; tax authorities of resident states 
of other group companies, if in disagreement with decisions of the PTA, should appeal 
before a court of the Member State of the PTA and enjoy at least the same rights as 
taxpayers of this State125.   
    Given the difference on procedural rights standards between Member States, the 
possible lack of reciprocity in the treatment of the plaintiff tax authorities may risk 
creating tensions between the different national tax authorities, in addition to the 
difficulties that may arise for the very working of the scheme in case of tax residence 
conflicts concerning the parent company and of difficulties in locating its POEM. This 
because the very CCCTB scheme, if it were made compulsory under the current 
proposal,  would still need to rely on the POEM126 to identify the country of residence 
of the “principal taxpayer” in situations of dual tax residence.  
    Ultimately, in light of the foregoing, an optimal solution would need to ensure: 
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 a) exclusive taxation in the country where profits originate, to rebuild to the highest 
possible extent the link between taxation and where profits are made;  
b) an immovable tax base, providing the incentive for countries to spontaneously 
approximate  their corporate tax rates, to eliminate the risk of profit shifting;  
c) a multilateral sharing of information, which would be even more effective than a 
bilateral automatic exchange of information, to strengthen to the highest possible extent 
the administrative cooperation between national tax authorities and turn it into an 
“administrative integration”;  
d) a one-stop-shop for the fulfillment of all corporate tax obligations toward all 
countries to which a corporate taxpayer has tax liability, to simplify cross-border tax 
compliance.  
   However, to avoid tensions between national tax authorities, the “one-stop-shop” 
could be not a national tax authority operating on behalf of other national tax authorities 
as well, but a new European office made up of permanent representatives of national 
tax authorities, i.e. a new European One Stop Shop (EOSS), as argued elsewhere127. In 
other terms, from the procedural viewpoint, the EU should ideally be regarded – by 
companies earning profits in more Member States and having tax liability toward more 
EU countries -  as one single jurisdiction for tax residence purposes, which would make 
it possible to infer that the EOSS would lead to an “EU tax residence”.  In the event of 
setting up of the EOSS, it should be for it – as a “one-stop-shop” - to collect tax returns 
and payments from all companies gaining profits in more Member States, and to 
retransmit all documentation and payments to each concerned national tax authority. 
Companies should be allowed – for simplification purposes – to use not different 
national tax returns forms, but a single unified tax return,  to be sent to the EOSS and 
simultaneously accessible to all national tax authorities. In this single unified tax return, 
they should be able to report the profit arising in each Member State as well as the 
amount of corporate tax to be paid in each jurisdiction on a source-base; all information 
should be stored in a central database128 immediately accessible to all concerned 
national tax authorities (multilateral sharing of information).  This tax reporting 
solution would ultimately have the same role as the CbCR proposed by the 
Commission in the A.T.A.P129. However, unlike this CbCR: it would not concern 
transfer pricing (which latter would no longer be an issue once either the CCCTB were 
introduced or one of the academic proposals were followed), and it would not be at risk 
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of being inapplicable as in cases of bilateral automatic exchanges of information (as 
national tax residence conflicts would no longer arise).    
     The suggestion for an EOSS   -  just as the DBCT, the “corporate tax 2.0” and the 
NCCTB suggestions -  would imply going beyond the current international tax 
framework from both the substantive and the procedural viewpoint. In fact, ultimately, 
all these three academic suggestions would give up the national tax residence (as 
currently identified) as a connecting factor for a substantive tax jurisdiction130 based 
on the worldwide taxation principle.   
     In particular, the NCCTB would contribute to overcoming the national tax residence 
together with the complementary suggestion for a tax on “residual profit” levied at EU 
level131, which would need to uniformly apply to companies resident in whatever 
Member State.  
     Obviously, in the design and application of a tax levied at EU level, even if limited 
to the “residual profits”,  residence in one or in another Member State would not be a 
distinguishing factor.   Apart from its being limited to “residual profits”, this tax would 
be a re-edition of the suggestion for a European Union Company Income Tax (EUCIT) 
which was envisaged ever since 2001132,  and it would be consistent with the idea of 
considering the EU – for its application - as a single residence jurisdiction.    
     The EUCIT,  which would imply the introduction of supranational rules relating not 
only to the tax base, but also to the tax rate (and would thus go beyond the CCCTB), 
was regarded as not realistic for the time being, due especially to the high political 
sensitivity of the corporate taxation area133.  Nonetheless, it was convincingly argued 
that the EUCIT could be conceived either as a scheme addressed to multinational 
companies and applying alongside national rules or as a more general scheme 
applicable to all companies, that it could provide the EU a new direct source of “own 
resources”,  that it would facilitate the achievement of the action points set out by the 
OECD in the BEPS Action Plan and, lastly, that it would prevent Member States from 
using corporate income tax for tax competition amongst themselves134.  
    Instead of a general EUCIT,  an EU tax levied only on “residual profits” of 
companies – as suggested together with the NCCTB idea -  could still provide the EU 
with a new “own resource”, and leave Member States with a degree of autonomy in 
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determining their own national tax rates on the “normal profits” (the immovable tax 
base resulting from the NCCTB cost-plus approach).  
     The idea for  an EU tax on “residual profits” would certainly be – as regards its 
procedural application - compatible with the hypothesis of a EOSS.     
   Combined with an immovable tax base – created by either a sales-destination market 
or a cost-base -  and with the exclusive taxing rights to source countries (to be identified 
either with the NCCTB approach or with the DBCT/ “corporate tax 2.0” approach), the 
EOSS and multilateral sharing of information would obviously manage to achieve the 
outcomes of intended by the Commission in terms of transparency and of fostering 
collaboration between national tax authorities.  
    This solution based on a EOSS would also be complementary to the CCCTB, to the 
extent that - in addition to avoiding the difficulties arising in the event of problems in 
locating the “place of effective management” of the parent company – it would imply 
the setting up of a multilateral sharing of information system.  It would also make it 
easier the smooth functioning of the CCCTB, which would also be based on  
multilateral information sharing.     
    The multilateral sharing of information would turn the current phase of 
“administrative cooperation” between tax authorities of Member States into a day-to-
day “administrative integration”, allowing a simultaneous access to information. Due 
to exclusive source taxation, and to the immobility of the tax base, it would make sense 
for national legislators to spontaneously converge toward each other in designing the 
rules governing the tax base and the tax rate.  It would also become more convenient 
for each of them to have, within their jurisdiction, taxpayers earning profits in other 
EU jurisdictions rather than in third countries, because the multilateral sharing of 
information (within the EU) – due its being instantaneous - would be more effective 
than the automatic bilateral exchange of information (which latter, in prospective, 
could apply with third countries too). 
   Ultimately, the suggested solution would thus seem to be able to bring about a “single 
fiscal market”135 for corporate taxation, and, in consequence, to achieve the revenue 
stabilization for each country and the level playing field that the Commission stated as 
necessary goals.  It was submitted that – as regards the EU’s strategy focusing on 
fighting international tax avoidance –some partial harmonization is essential if the EU 
efforts are to succeed136: the solution here proposed could, eventually, bring about the 
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same outcome, but it would do so through an alternative route created by 
administrative integration, stability of the tax base and bottom-up convergence.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
   The Commission’s objectives to ensure taxation where profits are really generated, 
and to counter international tax avoidance, are ultimately shared by academic proposals 
for reform such as the DBCT, the “Corporate Tax 2.0” or the NCCTB. These proposals, 
however, suggest achieving these objectives by going beyond the current international 
tax law framework for corporate taxation, whereas the Commission (as well as the 
OECD) appears to stick to this framework, i.e. to the same international tax law 
framework in which distortions such as profit shifting have arisen. It follows, from the 
foregoing analysis,  that these academic proposals would seem to be more consistent 
with the ultimate objectives.   
        The best achievement of these objectives would,  therefore,  require the quest for 
an optimal corporate tax system, that should no longer be based on the distinction 
between residents and non-residents, that should ensure an immobile tax base – so as 
to eliminate profit shifting phenomenon – and that should combine transparency and 
collaboration between tax authorities with simplification of compliance of tax 
obligations for companies having cross-border incomes.  
       Although a simplification of tax compliance through a one-stop-shop system and 
a new connecting factor for the tax base are common to the academic proposals and to 
the Commission’s long-term objective of introducing a mandatory CCCTB,  the 
academic proposals have been suggesting solutions that would deprive of their own 
purpose most of the shorter term initiatives proposed by the Commission both in the 
2015 Action Plan and in the A.T.A.P.   
    The solution here suggested - whilst being complementary with the CCCTB in 
advancing the multilateral sharing of information - would aim at collecting the key 
inputs of the academic proposals in terms of immovability of the tax base, consistently 
with the stated intention of rebuilding the link between taxation and where the profits 
really originate.   
     Ultimately, there appear to be a key step that, at least at conceptual level, needs to 
be taken in the quest for an optimal corporate taxation system and for an effective fight 
against international tax avoidance: to definitively agree, at an academic and decision-
makers’ level, on whether companies’ profits ultimately originate where the business 
activity is carried on, as indicated by costs incurred (as in the NCCTB suggestion),  or 
where the market base is located, if different (DBCT or “corporate tax 2.0” 
suggestions).  In this regard - as any company would, as a minimum goal, aim at 
achieving stability of its profits - the greatest possible geographical immovability of 
the tax base should be the guiding criteria in a conceptual choice between a cost-base 
and a market-base. Once a connecting factor for exclusive source taxation capable of 
ensuring a immovable tax base were identified within the EU, the currently overriding 
concerns about preventing base erosion, profit shifting and double non-taxation would 
be overcome. Moreover, it would be in the mutual interest to achieve an 
“administrative integration” between tax authorities through a multilateral sharing of 
information - allowing each country immediate access to information about income 
arising or losses suffered in other countries - to be able to consider these information 
by applying its tax rates accordingly.  
    These outcomes, i.e. the stability of the tax base, and the “administrative integration” 
between national tax authorities  – even if the long-term goal of introducing a 
mandatory CCCTB proved to be unachievable – would already be a cornerstone of an 
optimal corporate tax system and for an effective fight against international tax 
avoidance within the EU.  To the extent that such outcomes - once achieved within the 
EU - may trigger a rethinking of the foundations of the international tax system outside 
the EU too,  they could mark a key step in the quest for an optimal corporate tax system 
and for the most effective fight against international tax avoidance at wider 
international level as well.  
    
